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NOTES
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD:
REVISITING THE SUPREME COURT’S STANCE
ON PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Robert Colton*
In the United States, state legislatures have drawn voting districts to
achieve desired election results for hundreds of years. Dating back to the
James Madison presidency, various legislatures and iterations of the U.S.
Supreme Court have wrestled with the legal and constitutional issues that
stem from the practice known as “gerrymandering.” While courts and
legislatures have, at times, been successful in eliminating some of the more
sinister uses of the tactic, such as racially motivated district-line drawing,
gerrymandering inspired by partisan motives remains.
Continual
improvements in technology coupled with an increasingly divided political
culture mean that partisan gerrymandering is at risk of becoming more
effective than ever. As a result, the voices of individuals with political
ideologies opposing those of the sitting state legislatures risk being quieted
to barely audible whispers. Until this year, however, the Supreme Court had
contented itself to stand idly by, firmly refusing to wade into the legal and
constitutional muck that is partisan gerrymandering.
This Note explores the uses and effects of partisan gerrymandering by
modern state legislatures. It then delves into the contentious history of the
partisan gerrymandering question at the Supreme Court level, with special
focus on a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in which he proposed a
solution for how to handle future partisan gerrymandering issues. This Note
analyzes the validity of Justice Kennedy’s solution and ultimately concludes
that his proposal has sound legal and practical support and would allow
courts to hold unconstitutional efforts to gerrymander along political lines.

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Duke University. I
would like to thank Professor Tracy Higgins and the Fordham Law Review editors and staff
for their assistance during this process. I would also like to thank my friends and family for
their consistent support.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1812, then-Massachusetts Governor and future Vice President Elbridge
Gerry reluctantly redrew the district lines of his home state in advance of
forthcoming senatorial elections.1 Upon viewing Governor Gerry’s distorted
districts, a cartoonist at the Boston Gazette coined the term “gerrymander”
because he recognized a striking resemblance in the new pattern to the outline
of a salamander.2 Although the cartoon arguably bears little resemblance to

1. See Jennifer Davis, Elbridge Gerry and the Monstrous Gerrymander, AM. TREASURES
LIBR. CONGRESS (Feb. 10, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/02/elbridge-gerry-and-themonstrous-gerrymander/ [https://perma.cc/RG5F-77E5].
2. See id.
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the amphibian, the term gerrymander was nevertheless born, and has survived
for more than two centuries.
Since the days of Elbridge Gerry, gerrymandering has become increasingly
sophisticated, and two main strategies have emerged for drawing districts.
The first is “packing.” This method entails a state legislature redrawing
district lines to fashion a single district with a disproportionate quantity of
like-minded voters.3 This method effectively wastes votes; for example,
instead of having three separate districts with 100 Democrats in each district,
packing creates two districts with fifty Democrats in each, and one district
with 200 Democrats. Through packing, Republicans may, as in the above
example, outnumber Democrats in two of the three altered districts, thus
giving themselves an advantage in the contest to control the legislature.4
The second method, called “cracking,” accomplishes the same goal as
packing but in the opposite fashion. When there is a naturally occurring high
population of like-minded voters in a single district, the political party in
power can draw new lines to split the like-minded voters into numerous
different districts, creating a slight minority in each.5 For example, if there
are 300 Democrats in a single district, and 101 Republicans in that same
district as well as two other districts, the district lines could be redrawn to
place 100 Democrats in each of three districts containing 101 Republicans,
causing one fewer Democrat than Republican in each of the resulting
districts.
Whether by packing or cracking, the controlling political party in a state
legislature can draw district lines to manipulate the proportion of opposing
party constituents in any given district, thereby maximizing the chances its
own party has to win the majority of districts in the state.6
As gerrymandering methodology has become more refined, the U.S.
Supreme Court has had occasion to hear a number of cases regarding the
constitutionality of different redistricting plans.7 However, the Court has
failed to establish a majority view of partisan gerrymandering in the past
In recent years, the question of how to handle
three decades.8
gerrymandering has become increasingly more pressing, particularly as
district lines have been drawn with an amplified emphasis on political
affiliation.9
In 2004, the current trajectory of partisan gerrymandering was established
in Vieth v. Jubelirer,10 in which the Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering

3. See Michael Weaver, Note, Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision over Partisan
Gerrymanders in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273, 1279 (2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 1279–80 (“Regardless of the method employed, the outcome of
gerrymandering is to draw boundaries in such a way that the groups opposing the new
boundaries are concentrated so as to minimize their representation and influence.”).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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is not justiciable.11 The decision was split, with Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence
Thomas making up the plurality.12 Writing or joining dissenting opinions
were Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and
Stephen Breyer.13 Although some names have changed over the years, the
same ideological divisions marked the Court’s most recent gerrymandering
case, decided in 2015.14 One Justice, however, attempted to bridge the gap
between the two distinct factions on the Court. Justice Kennedy’s First
Amendment solution,15 hiding in plain sight since 2004, could be the
country’s path to settling the law on partisan gerrymandering.
This Note explores the past, present, and future of partisan gerrymandering
in the United States by analyzing the lengthy case history of the issue at the
Supreme Court, an overlooked solution to the gerrymandering problem, and
the newest challenge to the current partisan gerrymandering rule. Part I
examines the harsh reality that modern American voters face due to partisan
gerrymandering and dedicates special attention to troubling electoral patterns
in recent elections and the practical effects gerrymandering has had on
citizens’ decisions to cast ballots. Part II focuses on the long and contentious
legal history surrounding partisan gerrymandering. This Part examines the
issue from congressional efforts in the nineteenth century, to the massive
change in judicial responsibility in 2004, to the most recent potential shift in
the Court’s governing principles in 2015. Part II then examines Justice
Kennedy’s proposed solution and assesses its viability. Finally, Part III
applies Justice Kennedy’s proposal to the gerrymandering problem and
discusses the newest partisan gerrymandering case to be considered by the
Court.
I. GERRYMANDERING IN MODERN AMERICA
The foundation for legislative control over state redistricting is located in
the U.S. Constitution, which states, “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof.”16 Although this Clause does allow for
Congress to intercede and overrule the state legislature, such intervention has
never occurred.17
There are numerous lawful methods state legislatures may use to redraw
district lines. Traditionally, districts were required to be contiguous,
compact, and, to the extent possible, contain an equal number of

11. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
12. See id. at 271.
13. See id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2659 (2015).
15. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314–16 (Kennedy, J., concurring); infra Part II.C.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
17. See Niel Franzese, Comment, The Open Our Democracy Act: A Proposal for Effective
Election Reform, 48 CONN. L. REV. 263, 285 (2015).
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inhabitants.18 Those norms have since evolved, and today the only
constitutional requirement for redistricting is the “one person, one vote”
standard.19 While redistricting often includes geographic contiguity,
geographic compactness, preserving communities of interest, and nesting,20
over the years there have been two impermissible redistricting motivations
that have invited judicial scrutiny.
The first, racially motivated
gerrymandering, is generally the domain of the Supreme Court and is not the
focus of this Note.21 The second, politically motivated (partisan)
gerrymandering, by contrast, requires further analysis.
A. Why Should We Care About Gerrymandering?
To explain the severity of partisan gerrymandering, NBC News
correspondent Tom Brokaw once said:
The fact is the system is rigged. . . . Seventy-five percent of the
congressmen come from gerrymandered districts in which they’re
bulletproof. They only play to one constituency. There are no swing states.
They don’t go home and have to prove their case, because they’ve got a
choir back home. And that’s a huge part of the problem here.22

While lack of responsibility is a part of the problem, the rigged system itself
is also a significant public policy issue: an elected official shielded from
dissenting opinions by the manipulation of electoral districts has little
incentive to represent the whole of his or her electorate.
Due to inaction, the judicial system has arguably become part of the
problem as well. By maintaining relative silence on the issue of
gerrymandering, the Court has effectively washed its hands of the problem.23
Some legislatures have proved capable of drawing equitable district lines.24
But others have not demonstrated a balanced response to the pressures of
gerrymandering, and the Court has appeared content to sit idly by instead of
holding legislatures accountable.25 The Court’s silence may lead one to
believe gerrymandering is not as severe as portrayed by Mr. Brokaw, but
facts and figures from recent elections substantiate his concern.

18. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion).
19. See Ethan Weiss, Comment, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697 (2013).
20. See id.
21. See infra Part II.A.2.
22. Donovan Slack, Brokaw: ‘The System Is Rigged,’ POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2012, 11:34
AM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2012/12/brokaw-the-system-is-rigged152993 [https://perma.cc/5SRR-CVFE] (offering Brokaw’s analysis as to what is wrong with
Washington on Meet the Press).
23. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (concluding that partisan gerrymandering ought to be
nonjusticiable).
24. See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.B.
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1. Hard Numbers from Recent Elections
One way to identify political gerrymandering is to examine the popular
vote and the number of seats achieved in the U.S. House of Representatives.
A disparity between the overall vote for a given party in a particular state and
the proportion of seats that party obtains in the House is not in and of itself
cause for alarm; it is likely that no one district is a perfect representation of
the state as a whole.26 One would expect these disparities to be minor, yet
that is often not the case in the United States, which has a history rife with
patterns of political disparity—an indication that gerrymandering has been at
play.27
From the end of World War II through 1994, the Democrats enjoyed a
disproportionate number of seats in the House of Representatives compared
to their popular support.28 The pendulum began to swing, however, with the
Republican Revolution of 1994.29 In every election since, the Republican
Party has earned more seats in the House of Representatives than their
popular vote tally would predict.30 This trend has increased in recent years,
with the 6 percent gap achieved by Republicans in 2012 representing the
largest disparity between the popular vote and House seats won since the
Democrats’ win in the 1992 election.31 In fact, the 2012 election saw nearly
1.6 million more votes cast for Democratic candidates than were cast for
Republican candidates in races for House seats.32 However, when the dust
settled, Republicans maintained a thirty-four-seat advantage in the House.33
This imbalance was no accident. The Republican State Leadership
Committee proudly broadcast its winning strategy in an article headlined
“How a Strategy of Targeting State Legislative Races in 2010 Led to a
Republican U.S. House Majority in 2013.”34
Both Democrats and Republicans have successfully used redistricting to
achieve electoral victories disproportionate to the popular vote.35 In 2002,
356 of the 435 total seats in the House were decided by margins greater than
20 percent, which highlights how noncompetitive a redistricting plan can

26. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289 (“In any winner-take-all district system, there can be no
guarantee, no matter how the district lines are drawn, that a majority of party votes statewide
will produce a majority of seats for that party.”).
27. See Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous
Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 331 (2014).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 6, 2012, at 73 (2013) (showing
the total number of votes cast for each political party).
33. See id. at 74.
34. Admin, 2012 REDMAP Summary Report, REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Jan. 4,
2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/ [https://perma.cc/W4C9567D].
35. See Franzese, supra note 17, at 286. Wide margins of victory and strong incumbent
success rates in particular demonstrate the power of redistricting.

2017]

BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD

1309

make an election.36 In all House races, only four incumbents who were pitted
against nonincumbents suffered defeat in 2002.37 Two years later, in 2004,
incumbent success rates exceeded 98 percent for the fourth consecutive
election.38
On a micro level, six states stand out for their gerrymandering-induced
electoral anomalies. In Florida, 40 percent of voters are registered Democrats
and 36 percent are registered Republicans.39 Yet in 2014, of the 160 total
seats in the state legislature, Republicans occupied 108.40 This discrepancy
between registered Democrats and seats occupied by Democrats has a long
history in Florida. Before 2016, the state voted Democrat in four of the six
previous presidential elections.41 But in 2012, Democrats won only twentythree of the forty-seven available seats, even though they tallied better than
120,000 more votes than Republican candidates in contested races and 52
percent of the overall popular vote.42
Pennsylvania also demonstrates the effects of gerrymandering. In 2012,
voters cast 2,701,820 votes for Democrats and 2,626,995 votes for
Republicans.43 Nevertheless, only five Democratic candidates were elected
to Congress compared to thirteen Republicans.44 The 2014 election was
similarly affected by gerrymandering. Fifty percent of the electorate were
registered Democrats compared to just 37 percent Republicans, but the state
legislature was nevertheless composed of 149 Republicans and only 104
Democrats.45 The 2014 election showed similar results in Kentucky,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and West Virginia.46

36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Mark Blumenthal & Ariel Edwards-Levy, HUFFPOLLSTER: A State-By-State Guide
to Party Registration, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2014, 5:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/27/state-party-registration_n_5399977.html
[https://perma.cc/SFK8-F7Y6].
40. See 2014 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Nov. 19, 2014, 10:00 AM) http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/
Legis_Control_2014_Nov19_10am.pdf [https://perma.cc/T73A-ZD7B].
41. See Devon Ombres, The Recent History of Gerrymandering in Florida: Revitalizing
Davis v. Bandemer and Florida’s Constitutional Requirements on Redistricting, 20 WASH. &
LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 297, 300–01 (2014).
42. See id. at 323.
43. Catanese, supra note 27, at 329.
44. Id.
45. See 2014 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 40; Blumenthal &
Edwards-Levy, supra note 39.
46. Blumenthal & Edwards-Levy, supra note 39. In Kentucky, 54 percent of the
population registered as Democrats and 39 percent as Republicans, yet 52 percent of the state
legislature is Republican. Id. In Louisiana, 59 percent of the Louisiana state legislature is
Republican, despite 19 percent more voters registering as Democrats than as Republicans. Id.
North Carolina features a state legislature that is 63.5 percent Republican even though 43
percent of its population is Democratic, with 31 percent Republican. Id. Finally, 61 percent
of the state legislature of West Virginia is Republican despite a full 50 percent of its electorate
being registered as Democrats and only 29 percent as Republicans. Id.
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2. Practical Effects on Voting
Resulting from Gerrymandering
Numbers aside, gerrymandering has real, practical effects. In a
competitive race, people are more likely to vote.47 Gerrymandering,
however, renders races less competitive, making a person’s vote essentially
moot even years before Election Day.48 A would-be voter who suspects
years in advance that casting a vote for a particular political party will be for
naught is likely to experience a decreased incentive to express a political
choice.49 The perceived futility of voting in gerrymandered districts has
inspired voters to bring petitions against gerrymandering.50
Given that the general election is often a foregone conclusion, the only
meaningful choice many voters have is in primary elections.51 However, in
some states, primary elections are only open to registered members of a
party.52 As such, would-be independent voters must register with one of the
dominant political parties in order to have any say in who may eventually
hold the public office.53 With the primary election often the only contest that
matters, more partisan candidates, who often fare better in primaries where
they do not have to appeal to the median voter, are never forced to engage
seriously with the opposing party.54
These effects of partisan gerrymandering could well be heightened in
future elections. Unlike the state legislatures in Elbridge Gerry’s day, today’s
state legislatures have the benefit of sophisticated computer programs to
create precise lines to maximize packing and cracking techniques.55 This
new gerrymandering technology allows mapmakers to learn an area’s
political leanings and adapt that information to create district lines in
whatever manner they see fit.56 The programs not only allow mapmakers to
increase the speed with which they can draw new district lines by creating

47. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 340.
48. See id.
49. See id. (“[Gerrymandering] can have the practical consequence of rendering a person’s
vote pointless. . . . For instance, if someone lives in a congressional district in which the results
of an election, based on the partisan make-up of the district, are easily predictable, a voter may
not have an incentive to vote.”).
50. See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan
Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1271 (2016) (explaining that litigants bring cases
because gerrymandering results in candidates who are not representative of the population’s
views).
51. See id. at 1272 (“[T]he noncompetitive nature of the general election leaves the
primary election as the only avenue for voters to affect their representation.”).
52. Primaries,
FAIRVOTE,
http://www.fairvote.org/primaries#open_and_closed_
primaries/ [https://perma.cc/LK26-E4BE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (“In a closed primary,
only voters registered with a given party can vote in that party’s primary.”).
53. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1272.
54. See Primaries, supra note 52 (“[C]ritics claim that closed primaries can exacerbate
the radicalization that often occurs at the primary stage, when candidates must cater to their
party’s ‘base’ rather than the political center.”).
55. See Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377,
388–89 (2016); Wang, supra note 50, at 1267.
56. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 333.
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massive databases with detailed voter-registration information, but they also
allow their calculations to be sensitive to recent voting trends.57
Gerrymandered districts often result in representatives who are responsive
neither to their constituents nor to shifts in public opinion.58 This led Justice
Stevens to write that “ample evidence demonstrates that many of today’s
congressional representatives owe their election not to ‘the People of the
several states’ but to the mercy of state legislatures.”59
B. The Glimmer of Hope for a Partisan Gerrymandering Resolution
While the Supreme Court has largely resisted addressing partisan
gerrymandering, Justice Kennedy has attempted to find a middle ground
between the ideological factions of the Court. In his concurring opinion in
Vieth,60 Justice Kennedy argued that “in another case a standard might
emerge that suitably demonstrates how an apportionment’s de facto
incorporation of partisan classifications burdens rights of fair and effective
representation.”61
In Justice Kennedy’s view, the path to such a suitable standard is through
the First Amendment:
First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law that has the
purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to
disfavored treatment by reason of their views. In the context of partisan
gerrymandering, that means that First Amendment concerns arise where an
apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’
representational rights.62

The “First Amendment interest” identified by Justice Kennedy is directly
involved in partisan gerrymandering because the interest includes “not
burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral
process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their
expression of political views.”63 Justice Kennedy, however, did not convince
his fellow Justices of his First Amendment solution and none joined his
concurring opinion.64 Now, more than a decade after Justice Kennedy
identified the First Amendment interest, a recent decision may provide the
opportunity to revisit his proposed solution.65

57. See id.
58. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1320–21.
59. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 n.24 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1196, 1202 (2004)).
60. See infra Part II.A.2.
61. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 314.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 306.
65. See infra Part II.A.3.
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II. THE CONTENTIOUS REALITY OF
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
AT THE SUPREME COURT
Turning to how the Supreme Court has handled cases of partisan
gerrymandering and how partisan gerrymandering (which is not per se
unconstitutional) differs from racial gerrymandering (which is
unconstitutional), Part II refines our understanding of the terms and
consequences of the gerrymandering debate.
A. Setting the Stage:
A Brief Judicial History of Gerrymandering
Before turning to how and why the Supreme Court has characterized
partisan gerrymandering as nonjusticiable, even though the Court has held
racial gerrymandering is justiciable, it is instructive to first examine how the
Court has generally handled issues concerning gerrymandering.
1. The Early History of Gerrymandering
Before the Supreme Court dealt with gerrymandering, Congress took
incremental steps toward mitigating the problem. Beginning in 1842,
Congress mandated that districts have a single representative and be
contiguous.66 In 1872, Congress passed a statute that required districts, to
the extent possible, to have an equal number of constituents.67
The Supreme Court first considered gerrymandering in 1962 in Baker v.
Carr.68 The Court split six to two, ruled that redistricting was a justiciable
issue, and outlined a six-factor test that included the “one person, one vote”
standard as well as the requirement that each district have an equal
population.69 In 1973, the Court again addressed partisan gerrymandering in
Gaffney v. Cummings.70 In Gaffney, the Court upheld a Connecticut
redistricting plan, but the Justices left open the possibility that certain plans

66. See 1842 Apportionment Act, ch. XLVII, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (1842)
(“[A]pportionment shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in
number to the number of Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one district
electing more than one Representative.”); Catanese, supra note 27, at 326; Justin Levitt, Where
Are the Lines Drawn?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-state.php
[https://perma.cc/3HUW-TRS9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (“A district is contiguous if you
can travel from any point in the district to any other point in the district without crossing the
district’s boundary. Put differently, all portions of the district are physically adjacent.”).
67. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 326.
68. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
69. Id. at 208 (explaining that a “citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by
state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution” with regard
to dilution by a false vote tally, a refusal to count votes from select precincts, or by stuffing
the ballot box); Franzese, supra note 17, at 287.
70. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).

2017]

BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD

1313

may be unconstitutional if the motivation for redistricting was a desire for
political advancement.71
A more concrete rule concerning partisan gerrymandering was established
in 1986 in Davis v. Bandemer.72 Although the redistricting plan in question
was not declared unconstitutional, the Court ruled, for the first time, that
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable.73 The Court explained that a
challenge to partisan gerrymandering could be successful if a plaintiff was
able to show that the state legislature (1) intentionally discriminated against
a certain group and (2) utilized gerrymandering in such a way as to cause a
discriminatory effect.74 Although the Court’s majority agreed that partisan
gerrymandering was justiciable, Bandemer was nevertheless a fractured
decision. While a plurality of Justices favored expanding the intent-effect
standard, all disagreed over the standard the Court should adopt.75 Justice
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion questioning the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering altogether.76 While appearing to settle the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering, Bandemer ultimately left lower
courts with more questions than answers.77
2. The Controlling Law: Vieth v. Jubelirer
In 2004, Vieth marked the end of the Bandemer standard.78 In Vieth,
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of the Court, overruled Bandemer and
framed the issue of partisan gerrymandering in the manner we think of it
today.79 However, the end of the Bandemer standard did not mark the
beginning of a clear standard on the issue of partisan gerrymandering. In a
fractured opinion that did not muster support from a majority of the Justices
and spawned a number of separate concurring and dissenting opinions, the
only point on which the Justices did agree was that the Bandemer standard
needed serious change.80

71. See id. at 754 (“What is done in so arranging for elections, or to achieve political ends
or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
72. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
73. Id. at 125 (“As Gaffney demonstrates, that the claim is submitted by a political group,
rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.”).
74. Id. at 127.
75. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 699.
76. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would hold that the
partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political
question.”).
77. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 699–700 (“[T]here was only one instance where a court
actually found a cognizable unlawful partisan gerrymander under Bandemer. Other than this
one anomaly, Bandemer proved an inapplicable standard.”).
78. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Eighteen years
of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of principled
application.”).
79. See id.
80. See generally id. Each of the opinions authored in Vieth offered different solutions on
how to either change or improve Bandemer.
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Suppose you learn that New York draws its district lines for the express
purpose of diminishing the strength of the votes of African American voters.
Odds are that you would get that heavy feeling in your stomach, you would
shake your head in some combination of surprise and disgust, and you may
even take to Twitter to express your indignation.
Now imagine that New York draws its district lines not to diminish the
strength of African American votes but rather to diminish the strength of
Republican votes. This iteration may not gnaw at your insides in the same
way. Why, though, should it matter which class of citizen is being targeted?
Vieth implicitly raised this very issue and the plurality, comprised of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas,
maintained that there is an inherent difference between partisan
gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering.81 Although the Court had
previously found a workable standard for racial gerrymandering, the plurality
believed that the same standard could not be used for partisan
gerrymandering.82 As such, the plurality held that “no judicially discernible
and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims
have emerged [since Bandemer]. Lacking them, we must conclude that
political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was
wrongly decided.”83
For the plurality, neither the plaintiff’s predominant-effect test nor the
litigant’s intent test was sufficient to make the issue justiciable.84 According
to Justice Scalia, although a predominant intent may be feasible with regard
to racial gerrymandering,85 it is not feasible with regard to partisan
gerrymandering because “[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable
characteristic, but may shift from one election to the next; and even within a
given election, not all voters follow the party line.”86 The plurality further
noted that “[t]hese facts make it impossible to assess the effects of partisan
gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally
to craft a remedy.”87
Indeed, there is a statutory basis for the Court’s hard stance on racial
gerrymandering that is not present in partisan gerrymandering.88 The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 explicitly states that no voting procedure should be
applied that denies or abridges the right of an American citizen to vote on the
basis of race or color.89 The Court has invoked this statute in part when
explaining why there is a difference between drawing lines to disenfranchise

81. See id. at 287 (“[A] person’s politics is rarely as readily discernible—and never as
permanently discernible—as a person’s race.”).
82. See id. at 287–90.
83. Id. at 281.
84. See id. at 284–85; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 701.
85. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (“[A]pplying a ‘predominant intent’ test to racial
gerrymandering is easier and less disruptive.”).
86. Id. at 287.
87. Id. (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 156 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
88. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
89. Id.
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racial or ethnic minority groups versus doing so to disenfranchise on the basis
of political affiliation.90
The Court has consistently held that districting based on race is
unconstitutional,91 rejecting any attempt to draw lines where the only
conceivable purpose is to segregate voters by race.92 Similarly, it has been
established that gerrymandering is unconstitutional where race—and not
other principles—is the dominant rationale for drawing district lines.93 Yet
the plurality declined to apply the judicial history surrounding racial
gerrymandering to partisan gerrymandering.94
Justice Kennedy concurred with the plurality, agreeing that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish a claim, and thus giving the Court the five votes needed
to overrule Bandemer.95 He did not, however, share the plurality’s analysis
of the distinction between racial and partisan gerrymandering, nor did he
agree with the plurality that there could never be a workable standard to make
partisan gerrymandering justiciable.96
Justice Stevens was the first of the dissenting opinions in Vieth.97 In this
dissent, which no other Justice joined, he stated that there should not be a
distinction drawn between racial gerrymandering and partisan
gerrymandering:
Gerrymandering always involves the drawing of district boundaries to
maximize the voting strength of the dominant political faction and to
minimize the strength of one or more groups of opponents. . . . It follows
that the standards that enable courts to identify and redress a racial
gerrymander could also perform the same function for other species of
gerrymanders.98

According to Justice Stevens, race can be a factor in assessing the district
lines but cannot solely dictate the outcome of the districting process.99 He is
of the belief that partisanship should also be treated in a similar fashion.100
Much like Justice Kennedy’s opinion, no other Justice joined in Justice
Stevens’s opinion.
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote that a new
rule should replace the ineffective Bandemer standard.101 Justice Souter’s
new standard required (1) intent, (2) proof that the plaintiff was in a cohesive
political group, (3) proof that the district was drawn against traditional

90. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286–87.
91. See id. at 286 (“[T]he purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race is not a lawful
one . . . .”).
92. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–47 (1993).
93. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995).
94. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287.
95. See id. at 315–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 306; supra Part I.B.
97. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id.at 335–36.
99. Id. at 336.
100. Id. (“[P]artisanship [can] be a permissible consideration in drawing district lines, so
long as it does not predominate.”).
101. Id. at 345–50 (Souter, J., dissenting).

1316

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

criteria, (4) a correlation between drawing and political group, and (5) a
proposal for a better district line.102 This standard was not, however,
accepted by the other seven Justices.
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that, though partisan gerrymandering
sometimes serves no plausible purpose, it could nevertheless be acceptable
in some cases and thus cannot be summarily dismissed.103
3. Threats to Vieth
The 2006 case League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
(LULAC)104 again dealt with the gerrymandering question. In LULAC, the
Court, though once again thoroughly divided, upheld Vieth.105 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court with respect to just two parts
of his opinion, declined to address the broader justiciability question and
instead focused on whether the standard proposed by the League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) was workable.106 He rejected the
plaintiff’s standard and wrote that the “sole-intent” standard lacked a
showing that there was an actual burden to LULAC and that the proposed
symmetry standard—which compared results of an election to the
hypothetical scenario where the parties’ vote shares were reversed—failed to
show “how much partisan dominance is too much.”107
Justice Kennedy did, however, explicitly outline the standard necessary for
partisan gerrymandering to be ruled unconstitutional. He wrote that “a
successful claim attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of partisan
gerrymandering must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory explicitly
disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the
complainants’ representational rights.”108
In multiple dissents, Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter once again
argued for the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering.109 And, yet again,
they could not agree with each other on a governing standard: Justice Breyer
joined Justice Stevens only in part, and Justice Souter was once again only
supported by Justice Ginsburg.110
In 2015, Justice Ginsburg reignited conversation on partisan
gerrymandering in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission.111 This case, unlike Vieth and LULAC, concerned
102. See id.; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 702 (outlining the aspects of Justices Souter
and Ginsburg’s plan, which they believed should replace Bandemer).
103. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[P]ure politics often helps to
secure constitutionally important democratic objectives. But sometimes it does not.
Sometimes purely political ‘gerrymandering’ will fail to advance any plausible democratic
objective while simultaneously threatening serious democratic harm.”).
104. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
105. Id. at 410.
106. See id. at 414.
107. Id. at 418–20; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 704–05.
108. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418.
109. See id. at 447, 483; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 705.
110. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 447, 483.
111. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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the ability of an independent commission to take over the redistricting
process, thus seemingly obviating partisan gerrymandering concerns.112
Justice Ginsburg, adopting language from Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence,
stated, “‘[P]artisan gerrymanders,’ this Court has recognized, ‘[are
incompatible] with democratic principles.’”113
Although the question of justiciability was not central to the decision,
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a significant setback for
supporters of partisan gerrymandering.
Finding that independent
commissions were constitutional, the Court effectively took district-drawing
power away from the Arizona state legislature.114 That Justice Kennedy
joined the four liberal justices in the majority opinion on a partisan
gerrymandering issue may foreshadow a majority decision on the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering this term.115
B. Weighing the Court’s Views
on Gerrymandering Justiciability
Having described the divide along ideological lines at the Supreme Court
with regard to partisan gerrymandering, the question remains: Why, exactly,
does an ideological split exist?
1. The Argument That Partisan Gerrymandering
Is Nonjusticiable
In addition to the racial gerrymandering argument,116 Justice Scalia argued
that a ban on partisan gerrymandering would be akin to a standard that says
groups have a right to proportional representation.117 “[T]he Constitution
contains no such principle. It guarantees equal protection of the law to
persons, not equal representation in government to equivalently sized groups.
It nowhere says that . . . Republicans or Democrats . . . must be accorded
political strength proportionate to their numbers.”118
Justice Scalia points to Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution, the socalled Time, Place and Manner Clause, to justify his argument that the Court
should stay out of partisan gerrymandering matters.119 Section 4, however,
also states that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”120 Therefore,
absent a Fourteenth Amendment discrimination issue, it is arguable that
Congress has a responsibility to stem the tide of partisan gerrymanders, even
112. See id. at 2658.
113. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
114. Id. at 2659 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Arizona State Legislature’s
complaint).
115. See infra Part III.E.
116. See supra Part II.A.2.
117. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (plurality opinion).
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
120. Id.
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though such power has never been used before.121 Support for that notion
can be found in Wesberry v. Sanders,122 which established that judicial
intervention is appropriate if a state legislature redistricts to debase voting
power,123 thus empowering the judiciary to be an active participant in the
outcome of partisan gerrymandering.
Article 1, Section 5 further militates against judicial involvement, as it
gives each house of Congress the power to judge its own elections.124 In the
past, however, this level of autonomy has not been afforded to Congress. In
Powell v. McCormack,125 the Court established boundaries within which
Congress must operate when judging its elections.126 This ruling could
function as the opportunity needed for the Court to overcome a Section 5
challenge by allowing intervention when a legislature redistricts to
disadvantage a political party.127
2. The Court in a Passive Role
Having discussed Justice Scalia’s stance on the Court’s relationship with
partisan gerrymandering, the pertinent question shifts to the effects of this
stance, including how states have responded to gerrymandering in the Court’s
absence and to what extent gerrymandering actually causes a problem. While
the Supreme Court has remained deadlocked in deciding how to handle
partisan gerrymandering, some states have taken it upon themselves to tackle
the issue head-on in the absence of judicial intervention.128
California, for instance, has approved an independent commission to draw
district lines.129 The commission comprises three registered Democrats,
three registered Republicans, and two members who are either unregistered
or affiliated with a minor party.130 The early returns on the commission are
good for California, as four seats changed parties in the 2012 election—the
first with the new commission—as compared to the one seat that had changed
over the previous ten years.131 Like California, Washington, Idaho, and

121. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
122. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
123. See id. at 7–8 (arguing that the framers of the Constitution could not have meant for
the strength of voters’ ballots to be dependent on what district the voters belonged to, and to
say otherwise “would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic
government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected ‘by the
People,’ a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention”).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
125. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
126. Id. at 548 (“[W]e have concluded that Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually demonstrable
commitment’ to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the
Constitution. Therefore, the ‘textual commitment’ formulation of the political question
doctrine does not bar federal courts from adjudicating petitioners’ claims.”).
127. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 710–11.
128. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 326–27.
129. See id. at 326.
130. Id. at 343.
131. Id. at 344.
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Arizona have all instituted independent commissions to advance similar
plans.132
Iowa has similarly made strides in curbing partisan gerrymandering.
There, a nonpartisan legislative services agency draws the district lines and
presents the map to the state legislature for approval.133 Iowa also has
specific laws for how lines must be drawn. For example, counties cannot be
divided, districts should be compact, and population size must be within
1 percent of the ideal population size as determined by the state.134
Although there is some evidence that gerrymandering is to blame for
lopsided election results, there is also evidence that it is not the only culprit.
Voters have a tendency to live in politically segregated neighborhoods.135
Democratic voters, for example, are more likely to settle in densely populated
urban areas,136 while Republican voters are likely to settle in more rural areas
with low population density.137 There is also some evidence that
gerrymandering-related problems wane after the first election in the cycle
and continue to lessen as time extends further from the date of the last
redrawing.138
Recent studies have demonstrated that gerrymandering is not to blame for
the current polarization in politics.139 Indeed, some studies show that the
Senate has become equally as polarized as the House of Representatives.140
The implication here is that the polarization in the House cannot be to the
result of gerrymandered district lines because Senators are elected by the
state as a whole and not by allegedly unfair districts. Studies also show that
polarization in the House is not believed to be the cause of the polarization
in the Senate, further distancing the connection between polarization and
gerrymandering.141
C. Hedging Against the Nonjusticiable Ruling:
Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment Solution
The counterpoint to Justice Scalia’s hard line on the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth.142 The
Supreme Court has consistently left the door ajar on determining whether
partisan gerrymandering is justiciable. Justice Kennedy, the swing vote in
Vieth and the author of the majority opinion in LULAC, was not persuaded
by the standards proposed in those cases, yet he has consistently written that

132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1267–68.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1268.
139. See Franzese, supra note 17, at 291 (“Current studies suggest that gerrymandering is
not an important cause of polarization . . . .”).
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See supra Part I.B.
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he believed a standard could exist.143 Given Kennedy’s status as the swing
vote, the viability of his First Amendment suggestion—specifically the
freedoms of association and speech—should be considered by future
plaintiffs.
Justice Kennedy’s solution has pros and cons. That political affiliation,
unlike ethnicity or gender, is easily changeable supports the contention that
political affiliation falls under the umbrella of association or speech.144 The
Court has previously utilized the First Amendment to prevent discrimination
against political parties.145 It has leaned on the First Amendment to ensure
that parties announce their candidates at the same time as one another to
alleviate the burden on the freedom of association.146 Similarly, the First
Amendment is invoked when making employment decisions based on
political affiliation.147
Even so, Justice Scalia opposed the idea of depending upon the First
Amendment in Vieth.148 According to Scalia, if a First Amendment claim
were to be sustained, it “would render unlawful all consideration of political
affiliation in districting, just as it renders unlawful all consideration of
political affiliation in hiring for non-policy-level government jobs.”149 For
Scalia, the First Amendment requires not the equal treatment of political
parties but rather that party affiliation be disregarded altogether.150
Political parties are the “most important mechanism for incorporating [a]
citizen’s preferences,” and it is the right of association that recognizes
parties’ vital role.151 The Supreme Court has previously found an acceptable
standard that balances the right of association with state interest by striking
down instances where associational rights were severely burdened.152 A First
Amendment standard focused on association would not require political
parties to be viewed as suspect classes to apply strict scrutiny.153 The focus
would be on the goal of government classification, as freedom of association

143. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006)
(discussing what a successful claim identifying unconstitutional acts would require).
144. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1273–74.
145. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 713.
146. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (reversing the appellate court’s
holding that Ohio may force third-party candidates to announce their candidacy earlier than
candidates of the major parties in order to appear on the ballot).
147. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (stating that if public employment is to be
conditioned on the employee’s political support of a party, it must “further some vital
government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected
rights”).
148. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004) (plurality opinion).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. JoAnn D. Kamuf, Note, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”: The Current State of
Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal for the Future, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
163, 210 (2005) (quoting Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science
Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 112 (1985)).
152. See id. at 209–10.
153. See id. at 210.
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recognizes First Amendment protections for particular viewpoints, including
those of democratic structures.154
The Supreme Court has stated that the import of the First Amendment is
greatest when considering speech taking place during a campaign for political
office.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people. . . . The right of citizens to inquire, to
hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition
to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.155

Although the Court has accepted nonverbal forms of speech in certain
situations (such as campaign finance), it has not explicitly decided whether
the act of voting qualifies as speech.156 Lower courts, however, have on
occasion implicitly supported the interpretation of voting as speech.157
Although the Court has never expressly regarded voting as speech, it has
equated casting a ballot to speech with regard to political expression. In
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,158 the Court explicitly refused to “stop
to canvass the relation between voting and political expression.”159 But Doe
v. Reed,160 decided in 2010, offers the most compelling evidence yet that
voting itself is an expression of political speech. At issue in Doe was the
disclosure of information on a referendum petition in Washington.161
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated that an individual
expresses a political viewpoint when signing a referendum petition.162
Furthermore, Roberts stated that expression of a political view falls under the
umbrella of the First Amendment.163
Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito all believed that the
signing of a referendum petition qualified as an expression of political
belief—even when the result of the petition is simply to place the issue on
the ballot in the next election.164 Although not stated explicitly, it would
follow that those Justices also believe physically casting a vote on the
referendum after the successful petition is also a political expression.165
154. See id.
155. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010); see also id. (“The First Amendment
‘has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.’” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))).
156. Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471,
485 (2016) (arguing that the Court has never rejected the argument that voting is under the
purview of the First Amendment).
157. See, e.g., Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 77 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31 (D.D.C.
1999) (“When a citizen steps into the voting booth to cast a vote on a matter properly on the
ballot, he or she intends to send a message in support of or in opposition to the candidate or
ballot measure at issue.”).
158. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
159. Id. at 665.
160. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
161. See id. at 194.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 195.
164. See id.
165. See Derfner & Hebert, supra note 156, at 487 (“Voting and petition-signing plainly
express a point of view and represent a decision to sign on to a particular idea in the

1322

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Thus, if voting on a referendum were an expression of a political viewpoint,
so too is voting for a candidate on Election Day. As such, this vote, like the
petition, would be entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
III. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING JUSTICIABILITY
THROUGH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In light of the Supreme Court’s past stance on gerrymandering, as well as
its First Amendment jurisprudence, partisan gerrymandering cases should be
deemed justiciable by way of First Amendment freedoms. This Note thus
argues against the Court’s hands-off stance on partisan gerrymandering and
instead argues that the freedoms of association and speech illuminate a path
forward for clarifying the treatment of partisan gerrymandering. In so doing,
this Note examines the most promising attack on Vieth to date, Whitford v.
Gill,166 which could, at long last, implement Justice Kennedy’s vision.
A. The Court Cannot Rely on Others to Fix the Problem
Despite
some
recent
promising
results,
some
state-led
countergerrymandering initiatives have not proven as successful as the
California and Iowa plans.167 For example, Florida amended its constitution
to include the following language:
No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the intent
to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not
be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal
opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political
process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice;
and districts shall consist of contiguous territory.168

Despite this seemingly unambiguous wording, some believe that legislators
use private accounts to communicate with the Republican Party of Florida to
create districts that favor incumbencies.169 Thus, even if some states can
execute a workable gerrymandering solution without the Supreme Court,
others are not so able.
The Supreme Court also cannot reliably conclude that the abhorrent results
are due solely to actions of citizens. Although politically self-segregated
districts may be the result of voter preference, that self-segregation plays a
role does not mean that gerrymandering does not still occur in other
districts.170 Additionally, even where districts are the result of political selfsegregation, cracking is a tool that can successfully dilute those densely
populated districts.171 Moreover, that the effects of gerrymandering diminish
marketplace of ideas or support a particular candidate who best represents the voters’ political
beliefs.”).
166. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No.
16-1161).
167. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 343–45.
168. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a).
169. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 345.
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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following the first election after realignment does not lessen the political
fallout from initial gerrymandering.172 Rather, it means only that the impact
of partisan gerrymandering diminishes over time, a phenomenon to be
expected because of the mobility of the U.S. population. Furthermore, that
polarization in the Senate rivals that in the House of Representatives does not
refute mathematical evidence that supports that gerrymandering directly
alters voters’ choice of who is elected to office.173
B. The Roberts Court and the First Amendment in Election Cases
The Roberts Court does not have an expansive track record of First
Amendment cases, in part because liberal plaintiffs who would have sought
to expand the First Amendment’s purview have been hesitant to bring
election-related claims out of fear that the Court will make matters worse.174
The Court has, however, substantially expanded the reach of the First
Amendment with regard to campaign finance. In both Davis v. FEC175 and
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,176 the Court
struck down financing plans that would have aided candidates running
against far wealthier opponents.177 In both cases, the Court concluded that
the First Amendment contains no guarantee of a level playing field.178
Similarly, New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres179 rejected the
view that voters were entitled to a level playing field in the form of
competitive elections when the Court struck down a proposal to nominate
judges in partisan primaries.180
In recent years, the Roberts Court appears to be softening on
gerrymandering issues. In addition to its holding in Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, the Court held in Evenwel v. Abbott181 that states
must draw congressional districts with populations as even as possible. The
Roberts Court has also ruled against a state legislature in which Republicans
were drawing districts with a specific focus on black Democrats—a case that
could improve the likelihood of a resolution on partisan gerrymandering.182

172. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
173. See Franzese, supra note 17, at 291–92.
174. Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp
Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1618 (2016).
175. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
176. 564 U.S. 721 (2011).
177. See Hasen, supra note 174, at 1604.
178. See id.
179. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
180. See Hasen, supra note 174, at 1612.
181. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). This case represents the Court pulling back from its previous
decision in Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission, 567 U.S. 758 (2012) (per curiam). See
Hasen, supra note 174, at 1613. In Tennant, the Court did away with strict mathematical
equality in drawing districts. Tennant, 567 U.S. at 762–64.
182. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262–63 (2015); see
also Hasen, supra note 174, at 1608–09 (“[Alabama Legislative Black Caucus] should
moderately improve the chances for challenging some Republican gerrymanders.”).
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C. The Applicability of the Association Resolution
Were a plaintiff to bring a claim on associational grounds, even if the claim
had merit, it may not be strong enough to persuade the Supreme Court to
overrule Vieth. The strongest support for an association standard is found in
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.183 Justice Thurgood Marshall,
writing for the majority, wound together the freedoms of association and
speech and stated that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”184 Justice Marshall
further erased the line between the political party itself and its members when
he stated that interference with freedom of party association is at the same
time interference with the freedom of its devotees.185 Perhaps most strongly,
Marshall stated,
[T]he Constitution grants to the States a broad power to prescribe the
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives,” which power is matched by state control over the election
process for state offices. But this authority does not extinguish the State’s
responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment
rights of the State’s citizens. The power to regulate the time, place, and
manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, . . . or, as here, the freedom of
political association.186

Although Tashjian provides some support for the freedom of association,
it may not be strong enough. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has reserved
the freedom of association for cases in which a state denies an individual
access to the electoral system.187 Additionally, the right of association may
just be freedom of speech shrouded in different language—as Justice
Marshall hinted at in Tashjian. The right of association is derived from the
need for speech in political arenas and not from any right of autonomy for
political parties and their members.188
D. The Applicability of the Speech Resolution
The most viable standard for the Supreme Court in answering the
justiciability question of partisan gerrymandering is the First Amendment
freedom of speech. The idea that the government cannot quiet one person’s
voice to promote the voices of others is ingrained in the Court’s history:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment, which was designed “to secure the widest possible
183. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
184. Id. at 214 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
185. See id. at 215.
186. Id. at 217 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
187. See Kamuf, supra note 151, at 210.
188. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 289 (2001).

2017]

BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD

1325

dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,” and
“to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.”189

This being so, it follows that partisan gerrymandering is repugnant to First
Amendment speech.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,190 the Supreme Court held that freedom of
speech—especially in the political arena—has long been secured by the First
Amendment and may well be the very reason for the First Amendment’s
existence:
The constitutional safeguard, we have said, “was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.” . . . “[I]t is a prized American privilege to
speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions,” . . . and this opportunity is to be afforded for “vigorous
advocacy” no less than “abstract discussion.”191

Given that the purpose of the First Amendment is to embolden the
populace to express opinions contrary to the majority, it is unsurprising that
plaintiffs have taken umbrage with partisan gerrymandering. When districts
are redrawn by state legislatures to dilute a segment of the population’s vote,
the “prized American privilege” is cast aside.192
The Court in New York Times cited Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California193 to highlight the place that freedom of speech held
in the values of the Constitution’s drafters:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.194

This language, woven into the fabric of the Court’s discourse on freedom of
speech, speaks rather pointedly to why partisan gerrymandering violates the
First Amendment as it was understood at the time of ratification.
The much-maligned decision Citizens United v. FEC195 also contains
strong First Amendment language. There, the more conservative Justices on
189. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)).
190. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
191. Id. at 269 (citations omitted) (first quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957); then quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); and then quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)).
192. See id.
193. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
194. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (alteration in original) (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S.at 375–
76).
195. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Commentators have criticized the decision. See Scott Blackburn,
Citizen’s United: It’s About Free Speech, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 22, 2015, 5:00 AM),
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the Court, who have proven less amenable to the justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering, constituted the majority.196 Justice Kennedy, writing the
majority opinion, stated that First Amendment standards “must give the
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”197 He further
noted that speech is most important during a campaign for political office and
that speech is a “precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary
means to protect it.”198
Most applicable to the issue of partisan gerrymandering, Kennedy
suggested that “the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor
certain subjects or viewpoints”199 and that “restrictions distinguishing among
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others,” are
prohibited.200 This is exactly what partisan gerrymandering aims to achieve:
district lines are intentionally drawn in such a manner that viewpoints in line
with the political party of the state legislature are amplified while differing
viewpoints are disfavored.201 This appears to be a restriction that allows
speech by some, but not by others, as only individuals who agree with the
state legislature are heard by their representatives.202
Even if “disfavor of certain viewpoints” is incidental and not intentional,
Justice Kennedy stated in Citizens United that “political speech must prevail
against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”203
Despite being a case about campaign finance, Citizens United can be
interpreted as a condemnation of partisan gerrymandering when juxtaposing
the language in the majority opinion with the facts that surround many
redistricting plans.
E. The Future of Gerrymandering Reform: Gill v. Whitford
The preceding Parts argue that there is sufficient legal support for the
Supreme Court to adopt Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment solution to the
problem of partisan gerrymandering. The Court will soon announce whether
it agrees, having heard oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford204 on October 3,
2017, its first gerrymandering case since Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission.205 Originating in the Western District of Wisconsin, supporters
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/citizens-united-its-about-free-speech/article/2559082
[https://perma.cc/ZYD3-N6LX]; Eric Posner, Citizen’s United Is Still Worth Hating, SLATE
(Nov. 9, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_
chicago/2012/11/campaign_finance_in_2012_presidential_election_super_pacs_lost_but_citi
zens.html [https://perma.cc/4WP7-BX7P].
196. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 316.
197. Id. at 327 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 446, 469 (2007)).
198. Id. at 339.
199. Id. at 340.
200. Id.
201. See supra Part I.A.
202. See supra Part I.A.
203. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
204. 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
205. Amy Howe, Court Releases October Calendar, SCOTUSBLOG (July 19, 2017, 9:59
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/court-releases-october-calendar/ [https://perma.cc/
75LY-ZTKY].
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of the Democratic Party and its candidates brought suit against members of
the Wisconsin Election Commission for employing gerrymandering
techniques to dilute the voting power of Democrats in the state.206
For the first time in forty years, Wisconsin elected a Republican Governor
and a Republican majority in both the Wisconsin State Assembly and Senate.
In the wake of this electoral success, Republican officials designed a new
redistricting plan.207 Plaintiffs—Democratic voters and supporters—brought
suit alleging that Republican officials used the packing and cracking
techniques to partisan gerrymander and dilute the vote of Democrats in the
state.208 Unlike previous plaintiffs in partisan gerrymandering cases, here
they created a formula to measure partisan gerrymandering.209 The formula,
called the Efficiency Gap (EG), measures the difference between the votes
wasted by each party divided by the total number of votes.210 The party with
the favorable EG result wastes fewer votes and thus is able to better utilize
its share of the total votes to populate legislative seats.211
The plaintiffs used the EG measure to articulate a standard they felt would
be workable for the court.212 Under the proposed standard, which would
create a presumption of unconstitutionality, plaintiffs must (1) establish state
intent to partisan gerrymander and (2) prove, via EG, a partisan effect above
a specified threshold.213 If the plaintiff meets the above evidentiary
threshold, then the defendant would have to rebut the presumption by
showing a legitimate state policy or an underlying political geography
explaining the problematic EG result.214
In Whitford, the district court drew heavily upon pre-Vieth Supreme Court
rulings. After outlining the long history of partisan gerrymandering cases
heard by the Court, Judge Kenneth Ripple stated explicitly that “[i]t is clear
that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause protect a citizen
against state discrimination as to the weight of his or her vote when that
discrimination is based on the political preferences of the voter.”215
Furthermore, Judge Ripple elucidated that both the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause “prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is
206. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137
S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
207. See id. at 846.
208. See id. at 854.
209. See Michael Wines, Judges Find Wisconsin Redistricting Unfairly Favored
Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/
wisconsin-redistricting-found-to-unfairly-favor-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/7DRGP8VJ] (“Several election-law scholars said the ruling was especially significant because it
offered, for the first time, a clear mathematical formula for measuring partisanship in a district,
something that had been missing in previous assaults on gerrymandering.”).
210. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 854. Wasted votes are determined by the margin of
victory for one party over the other. Id. at 854 n.80.
211. See id. at 854.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 854–55.
214. Id. at 855.
215. Id. at 883. Judge Ripple evoked Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), Gaffney,
and Bandemer in justifying his stance on the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause.
See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
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intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of
individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect,
and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”216
According to Judge Ripple, discriminatory intent with regard to a
redistricting plan involves an intent to entrench a political party in power
because it then impinges upon representational rights.217 The evidence at
trial showed that drafters of the district maps in Wisconsin were concerned
with the “durability” of their plan, which meant securing a Republican
majority in the assembly under any likely future scenario.218
The evidence offered also made clear to Judge Ripple that the
discriminatory effect was achieved. Among other factors, Judge Ripple
pointed to the fact that in 2012, Republicans garnered merely 48.6 percent of
the vote, yet they secured sixty seats.219 In the subsequent 2014 election,
Republicans achieved 52 percent of the vote but a disproportionate sixtythree seats.220 Thus, when Democrats achieved nearly the same percentage
of the vote as Republicans (51.4 percent compared to 52 percent), the number
of seats achieved by the parties differed by twenty-four.221 The evidence in
Whitford overcomes the problems presented in Bandemer, namely that there
are now multiple elections included in the data—not just one—and that a few
extra percentage points for one party would not definitively swing the
majority in the assembly.222 Although the Constitution does not require
proportionality, Judge Ripple’s opinion demonstrates that courts are not
barred from considering the ratio of votes to seats to find highly “dis
proportional” representation.223
Finally, Judge Ripple cited Justice Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence to argue
that gerrymandering that is unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective
is unconstitutional.224 The defendants attempted to show that the disparate
results in the election were due to the geography of voters in Wisconsin,225
but Judge Ripple was unconvinced and concluded instead that the
discrepancy was due to the specific districting plan being contested.226
Judge Ripple’s analysis was seemingly crafted with an eye toward
overcoming the Vieth hurdle and achieving approval of a majority of the
Supreme Court. By declining to enunciate a numerical line for what is
216. Id.
217. Id. at 887.
218. Id. at 895.
219. Id. at 899.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 901.
222. See id. at 902. Judge Ripple wrote that the pitfall from Bandemer was that the
redistricting plan was not proven to be durable but that Whitford’s durability is supported by
the presence of two elections and the swing analysis of three experts. See id. at 902 n.269.
223. Id. at 906.
224. See id. at 911.
225. See id. at 912; see also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
226. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 926 (stating that the production of multiple maps that
did not achieve as drastic a partisan advantage as the allegedly gerrymandered maps did proved
that geography alone could not explain the gulf between the number of Republican and
Democrat seats).
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acceptable, opting instead to highlight when a majority will persist despite
reasonable swings in votes, Judge Ripple evaded the indeterminacy problem
that felled Bandemer in the eyes of the Vieth plurality.227 Additionally, the
language “under any likely future electoral scenario for the remainder of the
decade,”228 despite not providing a clear answer to all future gerrymandering
questions, still allows future courts to identify exactly what the test is and
when the test fails.229 The efficacy of Judge Ripple’s attack on Vieth will be
known in the coming months when the Supreme Court issues a decision on
Whitford.
CONCLUSION
Given the recent trends of the Court, the time is ripe for a majority
resolution concerning partisan gerrymandering.
Justice Kennedy’s
suggestion in his Vieth concurrence that the First Amendment is the standard
by which the Supreme Court may find partisan gerrymandering justiciable
was unsupported by any of his fellow Justices.230 Nevertheless, there is
Supreme Court precedent regarding the First Amendment that refutes Justice
Scalia’s Vieth claim that there can be no workable standard to make partisan
gerrymandering justiciable.231
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech has long been
considered most sacred when used with regard to political speech.232
Although the Court has not explicitly characterized voting as speech, there is
ample support for such a characterization in other Supreme Court rulings.233
Justice Kennedy’s siding with the liberal wing of the Court in Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission makes it likely that the votes exist to
make partisan gerrymandering justiciable once Whitford is decided.234

227. See Recent Case, Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-BBC, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wis.
Nov. 21, 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1954, 1960 (2017).
228. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 896.
229. See Recent Case, supra note 227, at 1961.
230. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part III.D.
232. See supra Part III.D.
233. See supra Part II.C.
234. See supra Part III.E.

